This paper discusses the liability of asset managers in Scots private law. It is a contribution to a pan-European Study on that topic.
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Governing Law and dispute resolution regulate the business of asset management in Scotland, please refer to Chapter ___.
17-04
The role of the private law of Scotland in regulating the liability of asset managers is not quite as significant as FSMA. There is a dearth of Scottish case law on the duties of asset managers in contract. Moreover, there is no statutory regulation of the private law of asset managers in Scots law. However, a central role undoubtedly exists for Scots private law in the fields of the law of delict,6 fiduciary duties and unjustified enrichment (i.e. the law of restitution) which impinge on the relationship between the asset manager and the client, since these can be divorced from the duties and obligations which arise in the private law of contract, i.e. the Scots common law of agency. On balance, these areas of private law largely operate to impose obligations on asset managers by operation of law, independent of consensus or the intention of the asset manager and the client of the asset manager (hereinafter referred to as the "Principal", "claimant" or "client"). The relationship between each of them and the circumstances in which liability arises pursuant to such discrete legal bases is a particularly beguiling area which will be discussed in greater detail below. 17-05 It should not be forgotten that the obligations and rights of asset managers and their clients will also be conditioned by the contents of the investment management agreement ("IMA") concluded between them. Asset management firms based in Scotland routinely enter into relationships with their clients on the basis of the Investment Management Association's ("IMAssoc") industry model Investment Management Agreement ("Model IMA"). It is important to stress that clause G4 of the Model IMA provides for a choice of English law and the significance of this issue will be explored in more detail below.
II Definitions and qualifications
Regulatory characterization of asset management
17-06 For the public law characterization of asset management, please refer to Chapter ___.
The legal position in Scots law and the law of England and Wales is identical.
Private law characterization of asset management
17-07 Turning to the private law field, akin to the civilian legal systems, Scots law classifies an asset management contract -known in the industry as an investment management agreement ("IMA") -as a contract of agency rather than a contract for services. The contract of agency developed in Scots law from the mainly gratuitous contract of mandate,7 in terms of which the asset manager is the agent and the client is the Principal on whose behalf the agent is acting. The investment objectives of the asset manager are set out in the IMA and agreed with the Principal. It is standard practice for Scottish asset management firms to conclude an IMA with their clients which is based on the Model IMA. The legal relevance of agency as the contractual basis of the relationship between the asset manager and the Principal is that -on the face of matters8 -the rules and principles of the law of agency will apply to impose obligations upon the asset manager, namely the duty to exercise care and skill, the obligation to follow the Principal's instructions and the obligation to maintain accounts and records. The obligations tend to be lop-sided so that the agent owes a greater number of duties to the principal than the principal owes to the agent. Therefore, although the IMA imposes reciprocal obligations on the agent and the principal, it cannot be categorized as a synallagmatic contract where the duties owed by the parties to each other are the same or broadly similar in number or burden.
17-08
Since the relationship between the asset manager and the Principal is based on the law of agency, Scots private law does not require the relationship to be created, recognized or captured in writing and an oral agency is valid.9 An agency may be created by conduct where the agent commences acting on behalf of a principal. The effect of that rule is that the agency relationship may be constituted expressly (ie in writing or orally) or impliedly (ie by conduct).10 However, one must recall that the public law regulatory system does indeed require a written agreement to be entered into between the asset manager and the Principal.11 In practice, as noted above, an IMA is concluded which is based on the Model IMA.
17-09 On the basis that the law of agency derived from the contract of mandate, one would be less than amazed to learn that the Scottish institutional writers treated the private law of agency as being grounded in and constituted by contract, rather than by virtue of a gratuitous relationship or a legally imposed relationship arising by operation of law.12 However, as matters currently stand, it is not wholly clear whether the relationship is simply contractual or non-consensual in basis, ie, arising from the agent's office, since Scots law recognizes that an agent such as an asset manager can continue to owe obligations to a Principal in the law of agency subsequent to the termination of an express or implied contract,13 that agents appointed under a valid contract of agency may owe no fiduciary duties at all on the basis that their agency is limited in compass,14 and that a sub-agent may owe fiduciary obligations to a 9 Bell, Commentaries, III, I, 508. However, where the relationship between an agent and a principal is one of commercial agency under regulation 2(1) of the Commercial Agents (Council Directive) Regulations 1993 (SI 1993/3053) ("the Regulations"), Regulation 13 of the Regulations confer upon either party the right to call on the other to produce a written signed document setting out the terms of the agency contract including any terms subsequently agreed. principal despite the absence of any contractual nexus between them.15 Nevertheless, on balance, there are strong reasons to conclude that the relationship is primarily based on the consensus model, whilst at the same time possessing a degree of inderogable content which is attributable to the fiduciary nature of the agent's office. Although this discussion might seem abstract and somewhat irrelevant, the juridical basis of the relationship between the asset manager and the Principal is of great practical significance for the purposes of evaluating the validity of exculpatory clauses in IMAs or clauses in IMAs which seek to exclude or limit certain obligations of the asset manager to the Principal. If the relationship between the asset manager and the Principal is categorized as a contractual relationship based on consensus, then exculpatory clauses in IMAs which disapply the asset manager's liability for breach of duties arising from the IMA or the general law of agency undoubtedly will have legal effect. However, if the relationship is grounded in something other than the consensus of the parties, then a different complexion on the legality of exculpatory clauses in IMAs will emerge. This point will be explored further in Part IV below.
17.10 It is also crucial to ascertain whether the asset manager is a fiduciary. This is a matter of fact and is to be assessed independently of the contractual relationship between the asset manager as agent and the client as Principal. For a fiduciary relationship to arise, a party A must repose confidence or delegate power in favour of party B whom A has employed to act on his/her behalf.16 The greater the amount of power delegated or trust and confidence which the client (A) reposes in the asset manager (B), the more likely it is that the asset manager (B) will be treated by Scots law as a fiduciary owing fiduciary obligations to the client (A).17 In the context of an asset management firm specializing in individual discretionary portfolio asset management on behalf of institutional clients, a wide degree of discretion and power will be conferred on the asset manager in the IMA. For that reason, it is undoubtedly the case that the asset management entity will owe fiduciary obligations to the Principal. The Scottish courts are extremely likely to follow the reasoning of Rix J in the case of Ata v American Express Bank Ltd.18 that an asset manager with a discretionary right to trade on a client's behalf is in a fiduciary position. The relevance of the asset manager being a fiduciary assumes importance when it comes to the remedies which are available to the Principal on the occurrence of a breach of fiduciary duty.
III. The regulatory framework
17-11 For the regulatory framework applicable under the FSMA, please refer to Chapter ___.
IV. The private law duties of an asset manager
Duties of the asset manager prior to the asset management contract
17-12 Turning to the duties of the asset manager which arise prior to the formation of the asset management contract by virtue of private law, one has to look to the general Scots common law of agency and the Scots common law of delict for guidance. In practice, it is standard procedure for an asset management firm in Scotland to negotiate and enter into a non-legally binding agreement with its institutional investment clients which is known as a 'Progress on Report for Proposals' ("PRP").19 The PRP captures the main commercial terms of the IMA which it is envisaged will follow shortly after the conclusion of the PRP. The PRP will set out the investment objectives and bases upon which the parties intend to enter subsequently into a legally binding relationship with each other. When the terms of the non-legally binding PRP have been concluded and one of the parties subsequently withdraws from the relationship prior to the conclusion of a legally binding IMA, there is scope under Scots law for the withdrawing party to be held liable on the basis of the somewhat strained Scots law equivalent of culpa in contrahendo. The Scots law concept which imposes pre-contractual liability is known as 'Melville Monument liability' after the facts of Walker v Milne.20 The rule in Walker v Milne imposes liability on the withdrawing party for the innocent party's precontractual wasted expenditure in negotiating and concluding the PRP and taking steps 19 However, any provisions in the PRP relating to the confidentiality of information exchanged will be specifically narrated to impose legally binding non-disclosure and non-exploitation covenants, and, likewise, any provisions concerning exclusivity, governing law, and/or jurisdiction. 20 (1823) 2 S 379. A landowner raised a claim for reimbursement of expenditure incurred in preparing the land for the construction of a monument in honour of Viscount Melville. Due to lengthy delays in preparing the land, the monument subscribers decided to change the location of the monument to another site in Edinburgh (St. Andrew's Square). Although no binding contract had been entered into between the landowner and the monument subscribers, the court held that the latter were liable for the landowner's wasted expenditure. 'Melville Monument liability' arises where there is an agreement between two parties, one of the parties acts in reliance on the other party's assurances that the agreement is a binding contract, and the other party withdraws in bad faith in full knowledge of the other party's reliance.
to prepare for the IMA. Such liability for wasted expenditure will attach to the asset manager when it withdraws in bad faith prior to the conclusion of the IMA with the Principal. Conversely, the rule in Walker v Milne will also impose pre-contractual liability on the client to make good the asset manager's pre-contractual wasted expenditure in negotiating and concluding the PRP where the client has withdrawn in bad faith. This is one area where clear water divides the approaches in Scots law and English law because in Walford v Miles,21 the House of Lords held that English law does not subject a party to pre-contractual liability by imposing an obligation to negotiate in good faith to conclude a contract. However, the latitude of pre-contractual liability in Scots law pursuant to the rule in Walker v Milne has been constrained22 to the point that the Scottish judiciary recently doubted whether it remained good law.23
Nevertheless, there are persuasive reasons to suggest that 'Melville Monument liability' should not be abandoned or excised from the common law of Scotland, bearing in mind that it performs a wider role than that of estoppel in English law and is likely one of the many manifestations or instantiations of a wider concept of good faith which permeates throughout Scots contract law.24 17-13 When the parties enter into a contractual relationship with each other by concluding an IMA subsequent to the PRP, the asset manager's contractual, fiduciary, and delictual duties will serve to impose obligations on the asset manager prior to the formation of the contract. For example, the asset manager's duty of skill and care which is based on the law of agency will function to enjoin the asset manager to exercise a degree of care before entering into the IMA which is consistent with that of a prudent man in managing his own affairs25 or if higher, the standard of a reasonably competent and careful asset manager.26 Furthermore, since the asset manager is a professional person, a concurrent duty of skill and care will arise in the law of delict via the medium of the law of professional negligence. Such a duty will be relevant whether or not there is a contractual relationship in the law of agency between the asset manager and the client. The latter point is significant, since in the absence of any contract 21 [1992] advantages. The amount, nature and kind of explanation to be given by the asset manager to the client must be tailored according to the client's intelligence and experience and the nature of the subject which is being discussed. Thus, the steps which the asset manager must take will vary according to the nature of the client. The less experienced the client, the more explanation, disclosure and risk warnings that must be given and the more information about the client which will be required. The end result is that the liability of the asset manager will be conditioned by the steps which the asset manager took and in turn, the depth of the steps which it must take will be carved by reference to the sophistication of the client.
17-15 Unlike English law,29 in Scots law, there is no authority for the proposition that the standard of care in the law of agency or the law of delict which the asset manager is expected to discharge in order to comply with its private law duty to exercise due skill and care will incorporate the obligations of the asset manager under the Conduct of When the Principal would have been classified as a retail client pursuant to Rules 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 of COBS, reflective of the requirements under COBS, the standard of care imposed on the asset manager in the law of agency and delict will be higher than if the Principal had been a professional client or eligible counterparty. The end result is that the private law duties of care in agency and delict will be breached when an asset manager fails to comply with the regulatory rules in COBS prior to the conclusion of the IMA. Furthermore, in order to ensure compliance with its private law duties of care and skill, the manager will be enjoined to obtain information from the Principal which enables it to comply with its suitability and 'know-your-customer' obligations under Rule 9 of COBS, i.e. to be able to assess its Principal's knowledge and experience in the relevant investment field, financial situation and investment outlook and objectives, as well as to determine whether the investment process or model offered by the asset manager as a service is suitable to achieve those investment objectives, compatible with the Principal's experience and knowledge and commensurate with the degree of financial risk which the Principal is willing to bear.
However, that is not to say that compliance with all of the regulatory rules in COBS prior to the formation of a contract will offer a sufficient defence to an asset manager who has been sued for a breach of its delictual duty of care. The point is moot in Scots law, but it is unlikely that a court would exonerate an asset manager on the sole 17-16 Since the asset management firm engaged in individual discretionary institutional portfolio asset management services is a fiduciary, it will owe fiduciary duties to the Principal prior to the formation of the IMA. For example, the asset manager will be under a duty in pre-contractual negotiations which amounts to a form of good faith disclosure of any potential conflict of interest and duty, as well as prohibiting any misrepresentation or concealment of material information.34 Moreover, the asset manager is bound not to disclose or use information of the Principal which is confidential in nature which may have come into its possession prior to the formation of the contract.35 It should be stressed that such a fiduciary duty will be applicable irrespective of whether a contractual relationship is formed by the asset manager and the Principal pursuant to an IMA. Therefore, the fiduciary duty is imposed by law independent of the contract of agency and by virtue of the relationship of trust and confidence between the parties. of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations ("Rome I"),36 the applicable law of contract/agency which governs the relationship between the asset manager and the Principal will be English law. A critical matter which must be resolved is whether the disapplication of Scots law as the applicable law of the contractual relationship between the asset manager and the Principal is also sufficient to dislodge Scots law as the law applicable to the delictual and fiduciary obligations of the asset manager. Each of these issues will now be addressed in turn. Article 10 of Rome II provides that the applicable law in the case of 'a non-contractual obligation arising out of unjust enrichment, including payment of amounts wrongly received' will be the same law which governs any contractual relationship between the parties. Therefore, where the remedy sought for a breach of an asset manager's fiduciary obligation is an account of the profits gained by the asset manager and the contractual relationship between the parties is based on the Model IMA, the effect of clause G4 will be that the governing law of the fiduciary obligation will also be English law. Scots law recognises that the remedy of an account of profits for a breach of fiduciary duty is based on the law of unjustified enrichment, i.e. that it is restitutionary in nature.42 However, where the remedy sought by the Principal is the recovery of losses which it has sustained as a consequence of the asset manager's breach of fiduciary duty, Article 10 of Rome II will not apply since the remedy is not grounded in the law of unjustified enrichment and is not restitutionary by nature. How Scots law would choose the governing law of the dispute in such a case is unclear, but it may well be that Scots law would apply and clause G4 would be ineffective to invoke English law. The result is that the remedy sought in a claim of breach of fiduciary duty will dictate whether the governing law follows the choice of law of the contractual relationship in the IMA. For that reason, it may be that the governing law of the claim for a breach of fiduciary duty is indeed Scots law. On that basis, the remainder of this Part IV assumes that Scots law is the governing law of any such dispute, notwithstanding the existence of clause G4.
Duties of the asset manager during the asset management contract
17-18
17-20 In summary, the duties of the asset manager in the law of agency will be governed by English law when the relationship between the asset manager and the Principal is based on the Model IMA. Scots law will have no part to play in defining the agent's contractual duty of care and skill, the duty not to exceed authority, and the duty to comply with the Principal's instructions. Moreover, breach of warranty of suitability distinct from the English concept of Equity because Scots law does not recognize the separation of law and Equity. 41 The law of New Zealand is also instructive. In Attorney General for England and Wales v R [2002] 2 NZLR 91, Keith J held that the proper law of the agency contract dictates the proper law of the fiduciary obligation in Equity. Thus, it is impracticable for the governing law of the contractual duties and fiduciary duties to diverge. The New Zealand rule is predicated on the distinction between Law and Equity in common law systems such as New Zealand and England and, for that reason, one cannot necessarily reach the conclusion that Scots law would follow the same path bearing in mind that the law of Scotland does not recognise any such separation. See claims in contract will be governed by English law. Therefore, one should refer to Chapter ___ for an exposition of the contractual duties of the asset manager.
Meanwhile, for the reasons articulated at paragraphs 17-18 and 17-19 above, it is assumed that the Scots law of delict is indeed the lex loci delicti and that it governs any dispute in relation to a breach of the asset manager's fiduciary duties.
17-21 Turning to the Scots law of delict, since the asset manager will be in a contractual relationship with the client, the criteria in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman43 for establishing a duty of care will be met. The asset manager is likely to be classified as a 'professional' in Scots law and so the rules on professional negligence in the seminal case of Hunter v Hanley44 will apply. It will be incumbent on the client to satisfy a three-pronged test in relation to the standard of care expected of the asset manager.
First, the client must establish that the asset management profession applies a usual and normal practice in the context of individual discretionary portfolio asset management services to institutional clients. Secondly, it must be proved that the asset management firm has not adopted that practice and finally, it must be established that the course the asset manager adopted is one which no professional asset manager exercising ordinary skill would have taken if he had been acting with ordinary care. such an eventuality is unlikely, since it is common practice for asset managers authorized under FSMA to (a) diversify the portfolio amongst suitable asset classes and avoid over-exposure to certain instruments, (b) monitor the portfolio and the relevant market, (c) comply with the investment objectives and overall strategy agreed in the IMA, (d) instruct broker-dealers to sell and acquire assets and securities, and (e) report to clients on portfolio performance. The failure of an asset manager to do any of (a) to (e) above will undoubtedly amount to professional negligence on the ground that it is an extreme deviation from the ordinary practice of asset managers. However, when the client seeks to establish liability on the ground that the manager undertook any of (a) to (e) in a professionally negligent manner, matters will be more complicated. Much will come down to the evidence of professional expert asset managers in court. Where such evidence is given in court about the usual and normal practice but it is conflicting, the Scottish courts are generally reluctant to conclude that the asset manager has not been professionally negligent simply because the asset manager has been able to lead the testimony of a professional expert who would have done what it did. Instead, the court will enquire on an objective basis whether the practice which responsible professional experts support stands up to rational analysis.
17-22 Since the test in
Therefore, if a court is satisfied that a body of opinion, on which the asset manager relies, is not reasonable or responsible, it may find the asset manager guilty of negligence. Similarly, if the court were to conclude that an expert's opinion was based on a mistaken or incomplete understanding of the facts or lacked a logical basis, it could reject the opinion supporting the asset manager.48 17-23 As noted above, the asset manager will owe fiduciary obligations to the client. The fiduciary obligations owed are more or less identical to the fiduciary duties which arise in English law. Indeed, this is unsurprising since many of the seminal cases which have served to draw the content of the fiduciary duties in English law are in fact Scottish cases which were decided on appeal to the House of Lords.49 Therefore, an asset manager is impressed with a duty of undivided loyalty50 which mirrors the asset manager's duty under Rule 2. a duty of confidentiality,51 a duty to avoid conflicts of interest and duty,52 a duty of good faith,53 a duty not to self-deal,54 and a duty not to make a secret profit55 or compete with the client56 without the client's prior disclosure and consent. Such duties are manifestations or facets of the broader principle that a client is entitled to the unadulterated loyalty of the asset manager57 and are wholly inflexible. However, if the asset manager gives full disclosure and the Principal provides express or implied consent, the asset manager will be entitled to take the proposed course of action which otherwise would have been in breach of duty.58 The principal differences between Scots law and English law concern the legal basis for the fiduciary duties59 and the remedies which flow from a breach of duty.60 It is extremely likely -albeit not settled law in Scotland -that the content of the asset manager's fiduciary duty to avoid conflicts of interest will mirror and be influenced by the provisions in the public regulatory system, i.e. Rule 10 of the Senior Management Arrangements, Systems and Controls (SYSC),61 which forms part of the Handbook of the FSA and implements Article 18 of the MiFID into UK law. Indeed, rule 10.1.3 of SYSC sets out the steps which the asset manager must take to identify conflicts. Additionally, rule 10.1.4 of SYSC specifies the most common types of conflicts which may arise.62 This is instructive since Scots common law is not particularly enlightening as to the precise circumstances in which an asset manager will be in a conflict situation.63 That said, it cannot be stressed enough that the content of the asset manager's fiduciary obligations, 4 of SYSC directs that the asset manager must take into account, as a minimum, whether it or a person directly or indirectly linked to it (1) is likely to make a financial gain or avoid a financial loss at the expense of the client, (2) has an interest in the outcome of a service provided to the client or of a transaction carried out on behalf of the client, which is distinct from the client's interest in that outcome, (3) has a financial or other incentive to favour of the interest of another client or group of clients over the interests of the client, (4) carries on the same business as the client, or (5) receives or will receive from a person other than the client an inducement in relation to a service provided to the client in the form of monies, goods, or services, other than the standard commission or fee for that service specified in the IMA. including the duty to avoid a conflict of interest and duty, will be fashioned by the provisions of G13 of the Model IMA. Clause G13 is very important and is discussed in more depth at paragraphs 17-25 to 17-28 below.
Duties of the asset manager after the asset management contract has ended
17-24 Once the contractual relationship between the asset manager and the client has terminated, one would think that the fiduciary obligations of the asset manager would be extinguished. Indeed, this is the position in English law. In Ata v American Express Bank Ltd.,64 Hirst LJ in the Court of Appeal held that the fiduciary duty of the asset manager ceased once the IMA came to an end because the discretion conferred on the asset manager by the client no longer arose. However, there is authority in Scots law that the fiduciary duties of an agent can continue after the contract has been determined. In Connolly v Brown,65 Lady Dorrian preferred the view that what mattered was whether the trust and confidence reposed in the asset manager by the client still existed subsequent to the termination of the contractual relationship.66 This will be dependent on the facts and circumstances of the case and it is perhaps too simplistic to take the view that the fiduciary duties fly off as soon as the discretion conferred by the IMA is extinguished. On that reasoning, the duty of undivided loyalty, the duty of confidentiality, the duty of good faith, the duty not to self-deal, the duty to avoid conflicts of interest and duty, and the duties not to make a secret profit or compete with the client continue once the contract has been determined.
Validity of contractual derogations from regulatory and private law duties
17-25 The asset manager's private law duties in the law of delict will also be shaped by the obligations specifically provided for in the IMA. For example, under clause G17 of the Model IMA, the asset manager accepts responsibility for its own negligence and that of its delegates and employees in the law of contract or delict, but excludes liability for The efficacy of clauses such as G13 and G17 takes us on neatly to the question of whether or not contractual derogations from the fiduciary duties of the asset manager or its duties in delict in such terms are effective. The purpose of clause G13 is twofold.
First, it purports to enable the asset manager to enter into transactions with third parties notwithstanding the fact that such transactions may entail a conflict of interest and duty on the part of the asset manager, but provided that such a transaction is not materially less favourable to the client than if the conflict or potential conflict had not existed. Secondly, if any profit, commission, or remuneration is generated or received by the asset manager as a result of a transaction giving rise to a conflict of interest, the clause gives the asset manager the right to retain those sums without accounting for them to the client. Therefore, the clause indirectly operates to exclude the asset manager's liability for breach of the fiduciary duties to avoid a conflict of interest and duty and not to make a secret profit. The question is whether such a clause G13 is valid.
17-26 Clause G13 is potentially vulnerable to three lines of attack. First, Rule 2.1.2 of COBS stipulates that any clause which seeks to exclude or restrict the asset manager's public law or regulatory duty in Rule 2.1.1 of COBS to act honestly, fairly, and professionally in accordance with the best interests of its client will be a breach of the FSA Handbook. The question is whether clause G13 duties an attempt to do so. On a cursory glance of clause G13, the asset manager seems to be saying that it has the right to breach its duties to avoid conflicts of interest and duty and not to make a secret profit. That is suggestive of a breach of Rule 2.1.1 of COBS, since that can hardly be something which is fair and in the best interests of the client. However, on closer reflection, clause G13 probably does not amount to a breach of Rule 2.1.1 of COBS since it builds in certain safeguards for the client in the event that a transaction is entered into which gives rise to a conflict of interest or generates a secret profit for the asset manager. For example, the client is protected by prior disclosure of the asset manager's conflict of interests policy which describes the circumstances in which it will be unavoidable for the asset manager to avoid a conflict or generate a profit and how this situation will be managed. Moreover, the client has the comfort of knowing that the asset manager is under a contractual obligation to ensure that any transaction which produces a conflict of interest will be effected in a way that is not materially less favourable to the client than if the conflict or potential conflict had not existed.
The question then is whether these contractual protections are consistent with the asset manager's regulatory duty under Rule 2.1.1 of COBS to act 'honestly, fairly, and professionally in accordance with the best interests of its client'? On balance, it is submitted that the requirements of Rule 2.1.1 of COBS are satisfied by the protections for the client included within clause G13 as the asset manager is being upfront and fair about the position.
17-27 Secondly, section 16 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 ("UCTA") subject terms in contracts which seek to exclude liability for breach of duty arising in the course of any business to a 'fair and reasonable' test. Section 16 of UCTA will control delictual as well as fiduciary duties and has the capacity to strike down clauses which purport to displace them. However, since the asset management industry in Scotland centres around the provision of individual discretionary portfolio asset management services to large institutional clients, both parties clearly will be large commercial players and the inequality in bargaining power between contracting parties which the fair and reasonable test in section 16 of UCTA is designed to address is clearly absent. In a number of cases, the courts have emphasised that they will be very slow to apply the Turning to Scots law, unlike English law (where the role of Equity is stressed), the degree and content of the fiduciary obligations impressed upon the asset manager in Scots law are predicated on the amount of discretion, power and trust reposed by the client in the asset management firm, independent of the contractual relationship in agency. For that reason, fiduciary obligations arise by operation of the common law rather than by virtue of the terms of the contract of agency, and one might argue that it follows that modification or exclusion of liability for breach of fiduciary duty is disallowed. That would suggest that clause G13 would be invalid insofar as the exclusion of liability for breach of fiduciary obligations is concerned. However, it is submitted that such an analysis is too simplistic and indeed that is misconceived.
Instead, it is abundantly clear that fiduciary duties can be waived or modified by the clients of an agent (such as an asset manager) by full disclosure on the part of the asset manager of the potential breach of fiduciary duty and the subsequent express or implied informed consent of the client.75 It should be stressed that Scots law has no particular definition of what constitutes the requisite 'express consent' of the client and a broad-brush approach to the matter is usually adopted. Taking into account and paying close attention to the language of clause G13, it is more probable than not that it amounts to the express authorisation on the part of the client to the asset manager breaching its fiduciary duties to avoid a secret profit and a conflict of interest and duty. For that reason, as a general proposition, exculpatory clauses such as G13 undoubtedly will be valid.
Contractual clauses, market practice and model agreements
17-29 As noted above, the private law duties of the asset manager in the law of delict will Clauses G11, G14, G15, G19 and the schedule to the Model IMA are also significant.
They address the frequency of fund valuations, the provision of periodic statements and communications to the client, the disclosure of fees, charges and commissions, and the disclosure of dealing arrangements to the client. Clause G12 enjoins the asset manager to arrange for the execution of trades in the best interests of the client, to comply with all applicable obligations regarding best execution under the handbook of the FSA, and to allocate all executed transactions on a fair and reasonable basis in accordance with the requirements of the said handbook.
V. Liability of an asset manager
Liability of an asset manager for its own acts towards clients and third parties
A. Legal basis 17-30 An asset manager may be liable in contract, delict, or the law of fiduciary duties.
However, as explored above, the Scots law of contract will not apply by virtue of clause G4 of the Model IMA. Therefore, the requirements for a breach of the asset manager's contractual duties are not considered below.
B. Requirements
17-31 In theory, it is possible for an asset manager to be held liable in delict under the law of professional negligence or for a breach of its fiduciary duty. However, in practice, as far as professional negligence is concerned, given the strict nature of the test in Hunter v Hanley,77 it is not surprising that there are no reported cases of an asset manager being held liable to a client under Scots law for poor decision-making, portfolio management, stock selection, or fund underperformance. Provided that the asset manager pursues the investment objectives agreed with the client in the IMA, follows the investment process of the asset management firm, and can show that the practice it adopted is not one which no professional asset manager exercising ordinary skill would have taken if it had been acting with ordinary care, there will be no scope for a client to attain legal redress from the asset manager on the grounds of poor performance, portfolio management, or judgment. The position will be the same where the asset manager acts in contravention of the terms of the mandate agreed with the Principal in the IMA.78 To establish liability in professional negligence in such a case, the client would need to demonstrate that no professional asset manager exercising ordinary skill would have (i) breached the terms of a mandate agreed with a client in an IMA and (ii) acted in the way the asset manager did (e.g. by managing the portfolio or by selecting certain stocks for investment in the way it did), if such a professional asset manager had been acting with ordinary care. 
17-32
Although the level at which the standard of care is pitched will also depend on the sophistication of the client,79 this is unlikely to affect matters by rendering it easier to establish that an asset manager is liable in professional negligence. For example, in the case of a retail client, it will be likely that evidence in court will reveal that the expectations of an asset manager are much higher than in the case of professional clients, with an obligation to explain the nature of an investment to the client and to undertake more extensive prior diligence in a stock prior to its selection. The threshold of liability will then depend on whether the asset manager's deviation from that industry expectation is one which no professional asset manager exercising ordinary skill would have taken if he had been acting with ordinary care. This test will be extremely difficult to satisfy. Once again, the provisions of the regulatory rules in would also be possible to annul contracts entered into by the asset manager with third parties on the client's behalf. These remedies are explored in more detail at paragraphs 17-44 to 17-46 below. 17-34 A professional negligence claim by a third party against the asset manager (such as a beneficiary of a client or a shareholder of, or investor in, the client) confronts major challenges. The third party must first establish that the asset manager owed it a duty of care in negligence and that such a duty had been breached. This would be extremely difficult for the third party to do since it would be required to show that the asset manager had impliedly assumed responsibility to it in providing the asset management services and that it was reasonable for it to rely on the special skill and care of the asset manager.85 Since the asset management services are provided to the client pursuant to terms in the IMA, rather than to the third party, there will commonly be no proximity between the asset manager and the third party to satisfy the requirement for an implied assumption of responsibility and reasonable reliance. Furthermore, since no trust has been reposed directly by the third party in the asset manager, no fiduciary relationship will arise, making it extremely unlikely that any fiduciary duty will be owed by the asset manager.
Liability of an asset manager for acts of delegates towards clients and third parties
A. Legal basis 17-35 Once again, an asset manager may be liable in delict or the law of fiduciary duties in respect of the acts of its delegates, sub-contractors or sub-advisers.
B. Requirements
17-36 Clause G7 of the Model IMA specifically empowers the asset manager to delegate and outsource some of the investment management services and/or some of its powers to third parties and sub-advisers. The asset manager is also given the power to employ agents to perform any administrative, dealing or ancillary services required to enable it to perform the investment services in terms of the IMA. Clause G7 of the Model IMA directs that the asset manager will act in good faith and with reasonable skill and care in the selection, use and monitoring of any agents which it appoints. This contractual provision mirrors the terms of Rules 8.1.7 and 8.1.8 of SYSC,86 which forms part of the Handbook of the FSA and implements Article 14 of the MiFID Implementing Directive into UK law. Rules 8.1.7 and 8.1.8 of the SYSC impose an obligation on the asset manager to exercise due skill and care and diligence when entering into, managing, or terminating any arrangement for the outsourcing to a delegate of critical or important operational functions or of any relevant services and activities. The same Rules 8.1.7 and 8.1.8 of the SYSC provide that the asset manager must ensure that the delegate has the ability, capacity, and any authorization required by law to perform the outsourced functions, services, or activities reliably and professionally, as well as to monitor, assess, and supervise the standard of performance of the delegates.
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As for the liability of the asset manager for the negligence, wilful default or fraud of its delegates, clause G17 of the Model IMA stipulates that the asset manager will accept full responsibility in the event that losses are suffered by the client as a result thereof. The asset manager assumes such liability irrespective of whether the delegate is a third party or a group company of the asset manager. However, the presence of clause G17 does not mean that the asset manager will automatically be liable for the delegate's negligence, willful default, or fraud. To determine whether the asset manager will be held liable in the law of delict for professional negligence when the delegate underperforms or is alleged to have been guilty of misjudgment, the test in Hunter v Hanley87 will apply. Therefore, it is unlikely that the asset manager will be liable to the client or a third party where it is able to demonstrate that it supervised, assessed, and monitored the activities of its delegates in accordance with Rules 8.1.7 and 8.1.8 of the SYSC, performed the investment objectives agreed with the client in the IMA, and followed its own investment process. Liability will only attach to the asset manager if the client is able to satisfy a court that the practice the asset manager adopted in appointing, monitoring, and supervising the delegate is one which no professional asset manager exercising ordinary skill would have taken if it had been acting with ordinary care. As explained above, this is a very difficult standard for the client to meet. asset manager will only be liable for the negligence, wilful default, or fraud of its delegates, the implication is that the asset manager's liability for breach of fiduciary duty to the Principal or any third party is excluded. As noted above, the fiduciary obligations of asset managers may be excluded or limited by express consent of the parties in the agency contract and, for that reason, clause G17 is likely to be effective.88 However, matters by no means end there. Like the law of agency in the United States89 and South Africa,90 Scots law recognises that a sub-agent appointed by the asset manager will owe fiduciary duties direct to the Principal of the asset manager notwithstanding the absence of any contractual relationship between them.
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This can be contrasted with English law where the position is currently unclear, albeit that commentators have expressed the view that it would be desirable were a sub-agent under a duty to account to the principal. 91 In Liverpool Victoria Legal Friendly Society v Houston,92 it was held that a sub-agent of a friendly society owed a fiduciary obligation to that friendly society not to exploit or disclose its confidential information. Indeed, the fiduciary duties owed by the sub-agent will be the same as those which would have been impressed upon the asset manager absent the provision of clause G17,93 i.e. the client would be required to satisfy the court that there had been a breach of the duty of undivided loyalty,94 the duty of confidentiality,95 the duty of good faith,96 the duty not to self-deal,97 the duty to avoid conflicts of interest and duty,98 and/or the duty not to make a secret profit99 or compete with the client100 without prior disclosure to and informed consent of the client. The subagent's breach of any of those duties entitles the client of the asset manager to the usual remedies. 
Causation
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Contributory negligence, duty to mitigate damages and other corrective mechanisms
Therefore, where a client fails to fully disclose its financial circumstances to the asset manager when the parties are seeking to agree the terms of the investment objectives and process, this may lead to a deduction from the damages awarded on the ground that the client was contributorily negligent. It is not clear at present whether Scots law would recognise an asset manager's plea of contributory fault on the part of the client where the asset manager is in breach of fiduciary duty as there is no case law on the subject. The Scots courts would likely follow English law, but the difficulty is that the position in English law is also in a state of development as there has been little consideration of the situation. That is the case despite the prevalence of a general understanding that contributory fault is irrelevant in the case of a breach of fiduciary duty.111 Like most legal systems, Scots law also directs that a client is under a duty to take all reasonable steps to mitigate its losses which were caused as a result of the breach of the asset manager's fiduciary duties or its duty of care in delict.112 In Scots law, there is no equivalent of the rule in Civilian countries that the asset manager is under an obligation to mitigate the extent of the losses suffered by the client. For example, where an asset manager fails to apply a stop-loss on transactions in the portfolio under management, this will be of relevance in determining whether there has been a breach of the asset manager's delictual duty of care in professional negligence and for the purposes of calculating the extent of the damages awarded to the client. However, there is no such a thing as an obligation on the part of the asset manager to take reasonable steps to mitigate the client's loss. The Scots law of contributory negligence and mitigation of losses largely reflects the rules in English law. Once again, reference should be made to Chapter ___for a full analysis.
Limitation and exclusion of liability
17-43 For a detailed discussion of the validity of exclusion and limitation of liability clauses in IMAs, please refer to paragraphs 17-25 to 17-28 above. by the asset manager,113 and an action by the client to set aside contracts entered into by the asset manager on its behalf.114 Therefore, it is not necessary for the client to establish that it suffered an actual loss itself in order to attain a remedy. If an asset manager is in breach of its fiduciary duty of loyalty, e.g. by failing to be authorized to conduct business as an asset manager under section 19 of FSMA, the client will be entitled to claim such restitutionary remedies. When the client seeks an account of profits, there is no requirement to demonstrate that any gain made by the asset manager as a result of the breach of fiduciary duty was reasonably foreseeable and the law on the remoteness of damages is generally of no consequence.115 However, when an asset manager failed to consider open positions in a portfolio from time to time so as to decide whether or not to make trades, Ata v American Express Bank Ltd. held that the client's restitutionary claim for a breach of fiduciary duty was unsuccessful because no proved recoverable loss arose from that breach. Generally, a client will have no right to make a claim for the loss of a general opportunity to trade, since that is too speculative in nature.
17-45 As noted above, a client will be entitled to attain the annulment of a contract with a third party on the basis that it was entered into by the asset manager on its behalf in breach of fiduciary duty. If any money was paid or property transferred under that contract (which was void/voidable but was erroneously thought to be valid) to the asset manager or the third party, the client will have rights under the law of unjustified enrichment. The client must raise an action of repetition (rather than recompense) under the condictio indebiti and satisfy the court that the payment made or property transferred was not due or transferable and that it had been made or transferred on the erroneous assumption that the contract with the third party was valid.116 However, it may be that the contract with the third party cannot be set aside, e.g. on the ground that restitutio in integrum is no longer possible. In such circumstances, the client will have a right to take action against the third party to whom property has been transferred in consequence of the asset manager's breach of fiduciary duty and who is in knowing receipt of such assets. The third party will be in 'knowing receipt' when it has knowledge (1) of the fiduciary relationship between the asset manager and the client, (2) the fact that the assets transferred belong to the client, and (3) the fact that the assets have been transferred to it in breach of the asset manager's fiduciary duty. The property will be treated by the law as being held in a constructive trust by the third party for the client, and the client must raise an action of recompense against the third party to recover it.117
17-46 The restitutionary remedies which a client is entitled to claim when there has been a breach of the asset manager's fiduciary duty can be contrasted with the legal position when the asset manager has breached its delictual duty of care in professional negligence. As articulated above, where there has been a violation of the delictual duty of care, the client's remedy will be restricted to the recovery of damages in respect of the losses which it has sustained as a result of the breach. A claim for an account of profits or the annulment of a contract with a third party is not permitted.
VI. Governing Law and dispute resolution
Choice of law
17-47 Please refer to paragraphs 17-17 to 17-20 above for consideration of the effect of clause G4 of the Model IMA on the governing contract law of the IMA and the governing law in the law of delict and the law of fiduciary duties. For the rules on the mandatory application of Scots law (e.g. issues of public policy), the rules are identical to those which apply in English law and reference should be made to Chapter ___. 
Selection of forum
